Bug 9978 should have fixed them all, but some were missing.
We want all the license statements part of Koha to be identical, and
using the GPLv3 statement.
Signed-off-by: David Nind <david@davidnind.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel de Rooy <m.de.rooy@rijksmuseum.nl>
Signed-off-by: Martin Renvoize <martin.renvoize@ptfs-europe.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Moravec <josef.moravec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel de Rooy <m.de.rooy@rijksmuseum.nl>
Signed-off-by: Martin Renvoize <martin.renvoize@ptfs-europe.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Clemens <nick@bywatersolutions.com>
Allow a pattern too in Koha::Token->generate. Only supported length.
Does not affect CSRF calls. So tiny change without further impact.
Test plan:
Run t/Token.t
Signed-off-by: Marcel de Rooy <m.de.rooy@rijksmuseum.nl>
Signed-off-by: Josef Moravec <josef.moravec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Renvoize <martin.renvoize@ptfs-europe.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Clemens <nick@bywatersolutions.com>
Adds a internal routine to handle default values for the parameters
id and secret.
Also adds a parameter session_id for generate_csrf and check_csrf. This
session parameter is combined with the id parameter when generating or
checking a token.
Test plan:
Run t/Token.t
Signed-off-by: Marcel de Rooy <m.de.rooy@rijksmuseum.nl>
Signed-off-by: Julian Maurice <julian.maurice@biblibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Kyle M Hall <kyle@bywatersolutions.com>
Currently the CSRF token generated is based on the borrowernumber, and
is valid across user's session.
We need to restrict the CSRF token to the current session.
With this patch the CSRF token is generated concatenating the id
(borrowernumber) and the CGISESSID cookie.
Test plan:
Run t/Token.t
Signed-off-by: Marcel de Rooy <m.de.rooy@rijksmuseum.nl>
Signed-off-by: Julian Maurice <julian.maurice@biblibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Kyle M Hall <kyle@bywatersolutions.com>
Default expiry in WWW:CSRF is one week.
This patch sets it to 8 hours by default in Koha, and allows to
change the expiry period individually by passing MaxAge.
Test plan:
[1] Put items in your cart.
[2] Apply the example patch too.
[3] Send the cart from opac within the allotted 10 seconds.
[4] Send again, but wait some 10 seconds before submitting. Too late!
Tested 3 patches together, works as expected.
Signed-off-by: Marc Véron <veron@veron.ch>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Druart <jonathan.druart@bugs.koha-community.org>
Signed-off-by: Kyle M Hall <kyle@bywatersolutions.com>
Resolves the following comments:
I'd prefer to see a generate_csrf method than a CSRF flag.
It'd be better to use instead of require the 2 modules.
Signed-off-by: Marcel de Rooy <m.de.rooy@rijksmuseum.nl>
Signed-off-by: Marc <veron@veron.ch>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Druart <jonathan.druart@bugs.koha-community.org>
Signed-off-by: Kyle M Hall <kyle@bywatersolutions.com>
Move calls to WWW::CSRF to Koha::Token.
Send a safe random string to WWW::CSRF instead of letting CSRF make a
blocking call to Bytes::Random::Secure. If your server has not enough
entropy, opac-memberentry will hang waiting for more characters in
dev/random. Koha::Token uses Bytes::Random::Secure with the NonBlocking
flag.
Test plan:
[1] Do not yet apply this patch.
[2] If your server has not enough entropy, calling opac-memberentry may
take a while. But this not may be the case for you (no worries).
[3] Apply this patch.
[4] Verify that opac-memberentry still works as expected.
[5] Run t/Token.t
Signed-off-by: Marcel de Rooy <m.de.rooy@rijksmuseum.nl>
Yes, my server had entropy trouble (reason for finding the problem).
This patch resolves the delay.
Tested all 3 patches together, works as expected.
Signed-off-by: Marc <veron@veron.ch>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Druart <jonathan.druart@bugs.koha-community.org>
Signed-off-by: Kyle M Hall <kyle@bywatersolutions.com>
